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Being a democrat means accepting that the law is not a very durable sword
against authoritarianism. Democratic law bends and submits to the majority. When
push comes to shove, it lacks the capacity to defy anti-democratic, authoritarian
majorities. Of course, this does not mean that legal mechanisms and instruments
are meaningless in this context. They can work against and impede the rise of anti-
pluralist, illiberal and anti-democratic political movements. But it is important to
acknowledge that legal interventions and prohibitive measures that target anti-liberal,
anti-democratic political platforms also pose risks. They may undermine what they
are supposed to protect: a free and egalitarian political process that is based on
open political competition, pluralism and a free public discourse.
Yet, there are different approaches to safeguarding democracy by means of law,
and they merit differentiated evaluation. In what follows, I will critically address some
salient strategies. To hint at my conclusion: Structurally empowering and protecting
parliamentarism, effective opposition, and, in general, political pluralism, seems to be
the most promising and unambiguous way of making democracy (more) resistant to
authoritarian erosion. But one caveat is due: The structural dimensions of protecting
democracy must not in any sense draw away the focus from the social, economic
and cultural issues and prerequisites of democracy. There are cultural, societal and
economic aspects of democracy that cannot be maintained by legal means at all.
What’s wrong with prohibitive measures and legal
interventions in the political process?
There is a number of legal interventions that seem like robust, effective measures
against illiberal, anti-democratic political action: bans of political parties and
associations; restrictions of speech; rules that exclude authoritarian platforms
from public funding of parties and electoral campaigning or the use of public
infrastructures, including media. Yet, such measures of a “Militant Democracy” are
problematic in that they conflict with constituent principles of democracy: Legal
sanctions and interventions that address activity because of its political content
(“viewpoint-based measures”) have an illiberal, non-egalitarian and anti-pluralist
thrust. They are prone to partisan misuse and can have broader chilling effects
on the use of democratic and liberal rights. But more importantly, they might not
even be effective: A political movement targeted by prohibitive measures can find
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alternative routes for political action. If in any sense relevant, it will very likely be
absorbed by other/new organizations. A case in point are the measures of militant
democracy that German political institutions addressed at the NPD: A lot of time and
resources have been spent on trying to ban the NPD. After this battle was lost twice
before the Constitutional Court, a super-majority then changed the Grundgesetz
to at least cut off the NPD from public funding. But all this did evidently not prevent
the ascent of a new right-to-extreme-right party: The AfD has proven to be relatively
effective in absorbing the right-wing political current within German society that is
worryingly on the rise.
Is constitutionalizing democratic and liberal policies
a good idea?
Erecting procedural obstacles to the implementation of anti-democratic, illiberal
policies seems like another promising safeguard of democracy against authoritarian
majorities. Constitutional law can entrench democratic and liberal policies by
procedural means: If substantive policies get enshrined in the constitution, adopting
amendments will be subject to super-majoritarian thresholds (such as a two-
thirds majority requirement). But there are other forms of (relative) procedural
entrenchment as well: Constitutional law can provide for inter-institutional checks on
parliamentarism (for example a bicameral legislature and presidential veto powers)
and judicial review of legislation, giving the judiciary the power to veto laws. All
these mechanisms accomplish constitutionalization in the sense that they withdraw
the subject matters to which they apply from pure majoritarian decision-making.
They require political consensus beyond the governing majority, across partisan
lines and/or across the branches of government. All this can limit the capacities of
authoritarian majorities to damage a democratic order.
Elections are at the center of contemporary democratic political systems. Therefore,
at first sight, the body of rules that guarantee egalitarian and free elections is
a plausible candidate for constitutionalization. If, in the German context, the
Grundgesetz would contain the rules governing elections, a (double) two-thirds
majority would be needed for amendments. Yet, constitutionalizing the electoral
regime is, for a number of reasons, not a simple and unambiguous thing to do. First
of all, constitutionalization is hard to realize for political subject matters that are
politically contentious, as election laws are: They shape the outcomes of political
competition and trigger conflicting strategic interests of political parties. Therefore,
the broad consensus required to constitutionally entrench concrete electoral rules
may very well not be achievable in the first place. But even if such a consensus
could be realized, a crucial question remains: To what extent should the electoral
system be enshrined in the constitution? Exactly which aspects to put into the
constitution, and which not? This issue has no obvious solution, it is political in
itself. At the same time, it has wide-ranging implications in that constitutionalization
can also have problematic effects: It diminishes adaptability. Any electoral system
one may want to constitutionalize for protective reasons can in the future produce
unwanted, problematic consequences. Depending on the – unpredictable –
development of the political landscape, a previously functional electoral system
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may generate inegalitarian outcomes (such as Überhangmandate and negatives
Stimmgewicht).
But in any case, constitutionalizing substantive policies has general downsides:
Super-majoritarian requirements and counter-majoritarian veto powers come at the
expense of open and egalitarian political decision-making, for which majority rule is
indispensable. They increase the power of the judiciary, which exercises an elitist
way of political control and is not immune to politicization. And they decrease the
capacity of the political system to act – to pass laws, most importantly. Depending
on political circumstances, they can, in the worst case, create gridlock. Yet, salient
cases of ineffectiveness may undermine citizens’ confidence and trust in the political
system as a whole and fuel anti-system sentiments. Constitutionalization thus has
some potential to weaken the very thing that it is supposed to protect: a functioning
democracy.
How to protect fair, egalitarian and pluralist political
competition?
Constitutionalization is neither an unambiguous nor a readily available way to
protect a democratic electoral system. But maintaining fair, open and egalitarian
political competition is nonetheless crucial for democracy – and the electoral
system is clearly one of its most vulnerable spots: Hungary and Poland illustrate
the many ways in which electoral laws may be amended, deregulated or applied to
disadvantage political opponents of anti-pluralist, illiberal movements. In general,
in the hands of partisan actors, legal standards and oversight procedures in the
field of elections, party regulation and party financing may be applied in a politicized
way and beyond their legitimate functions. Institutions tasked with administration
and oversight of elections and party regulation have shown to be a relatively easy
target for partisan capture and misuse. Therefore, it is worthwhile considering
whether the German institutions in this field are well-designed to resist capture.
Two institutions seem especially vulnerable with a view to partisan capture: Firstly,
the Bundeswahlleiter (Federal Elections Officer), who supervises the organization
and conduct of elections to the Bundestag, determines and announces the general
election result, verifies the proper election conduct, etc. and appoints the Federal
Electoral Committee, which handles other aspects of the administration of elections.
The Bundeswahlleiter is appointed by the Federal Minister of the Interior, who,
as matter of convention, will select the President of the Federal Statistical Office.
Secondly and equally sensitive, oversight of party finances and financing is the
responsibility of one actor: The President of the Bundestag. In both cases, oversight
of crucial aspects of fair, egalitarian and pluralist political competition is exercised
under the direction of the ruling majority: In the case of the Bundeswahlleiter, it is
a representative of the ruling political majority (the minister) who chooses a single
officer to direct the supervision of federal elections. The President of the Bundestag,
who oversees party finances and financing, is a parliamentarian representing
the largest political group in parliament. In both cases, the task requires non-
partisan, fair exercise by the incumbent, who is either a politician him- or herself,
or singlehandedly selected by a politician. In depending on non-partisan, bona fide
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conduct by political actors, the oversight regime as it stands is evidently vulnerable
to partisan capture.
Oversight procedures in the field of political competition can hardly be made bullet-
proof against being politicized. But monocratic, majoritarian institutions such as
the Bundeswahlleiter and the President of the Bundestag form a particular easy
target for partisan misuse. Pluralist institutions that represent the diversity of political
platforms and require cross-partisan consensus seem much more robust in resisting
authoritarian majorities.
Defending democracy through parliamentarism
Parliaments are essential for democratic government: They represent political
pluralism and disagreement and contribute to politicizing and checking on executive
action. Safeguarding effective parliamentarism is an important aspect of protecting
democracy against anti-democratic, illiberal movements on the rise. The advantage
of protecting democracy through parliamentarism is that it does not require
prohibitive measures and viewpoint-based interventions. Rather, it is mainly about
procedural and institutional guarantees of political pluralism and the publicity of
executive action. Parliamentarism indispensably requires opposition rights: The
opposition has to be guaranteed the right to participate in all parliamentary activity,
to present political alternatives and to challenge the majority. To be effective and
robust, these rights must be independent from the majority’s consent.
Making parliamentarism (more) resistant against authoritarian capture has a number
of dimensions, only two of which I can highlight here. The first sensitive issue is
the regulation of parliamentary speech and action by the opposition, especially
the governance of parliamentary debates and disciplinary measures. Generally,
parliamentary speech needs to be protected and immune from interference based
on a judgment of content. Moreover, to fulfill its democratic function, the opposition
has to be guaranteed the right to put issues on the agenda for plenary debate
without depending on the majority’s consent, especially amendments and alternative
proposals to majority bills. Again, with regard to protecting the parliamentary
opposition, institutional issues are crucial. If majoritarian actors exercise wide
discretionary power with regard to formally determining the parliament’s agenda,
chairing parliamentary debates and maintaining order, this depends on bona fide
conduct and is especially vulnerable to partisan misuse. If these tasks are in the
hand of majoritarian actors, such as the House Speaker/President of the Parliament,
this would give mala fide majorities effective power to target the opposition with
oppressive measures. Therefore, at least recourse to pluralist instead of majoritarian
parliamentary institutions should be guaranteed.
The second issue is parliamentary scrutiny of executive action. This concerns the
opposition’s right to demand from the government information about its action,
internal functioning and decision-making, and to conduct formal parliamentary
investigations. Opposition rights to information make executive action public and
facilitate democratic control. But they also work as a safeguard for the rule of law:
The duty to disclose conduct can have preventive effects with regard to abuse
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of powers and misconduct in general. These are important aspects of effective
parliamentarism in general. But they become even more important with a view to
the rise of anti-democratic, illiberal political movements: Robust opposition rights
to information are an indispensable resource for checking on and challenging
illiberal governments. Regarding the German system, one concern in this context is
that in a number of recent cases, the Federal Constitutional Court is emphasizing
executive effectiveness over parliamentary control and is, in some respects,
insulating the Federal Government from parliamentary scrutiny in sensitive policy
areas, most importantly, the activity of the secret services. But more generally,
a comprehensive duty of the executive to disclose conduct is indispensable in
upholding its accountability through parliamentary debate and public discourse.
Other concerns in this context are constitutional and statutory thresholds for
conducting and enforcing parliamentary investigations. There is a number of
constellations in which legal thresholds for opposition rights can effectively render
the opposition incapable of acting independently. If the opposition is becoming
more politically fragmented, opposition groups may in practice (no longer) be able
to coordinate to jointly reach quantitative thresholds for the exercise of opposition
rights. Constitutional and statutory thresholds should therefore be reconsidered with
a view to guaranteeing effective opposition under changing political circumstances.
On a generalized level, one thing is worth emphasizing: With regard to safeguarding
parliamentarism, it is essential to play by the rules in the first place. This means
upholding the full spectrum of opposition rights when anti-establishment parties
like the AfD form part of the opposition. Departing from the guarantees and rights
of effective opposition evidently sets bad precedent and may further fuel anti-
establishment sentiments. But – last not least – it is itself damaging to democracy,
which includes the idea that an open, pluralist and truly political discourse in
parliament and beyond will sort things out.
Maintaining democracy as political task
Altogether, maintaining democracy seems to be a political and societal task much
more than a task for legal interventionism. Legal interventions may be overestimated
as a tool for safeguarding democracy. Prohibitive measures and sanctions that target
anti-democratic, illiberal platforms (“Militant Democracy”) have an anti-pluralist thrust
themselves, are not immune to misuse, and may in practice not be effective in the
first place. Also, they are not able to address the subtler erosions of democracy:
partisan and societal polarization, derogatory rhetoric and animus, growing distrust
in and discrediting of political institutions, social and economic disparities and
exclusion, etc. Political culture and societal identification with and investment in
democracy cannot at all be held up by way of legal means.
Maybe democratic constitutions could and should – ahead of acute crises –
systematically be made subject to simulated stress-tests. A stress-test could confront
the institutional and procedural structures of the political system with concrete
scenarios of a changing political landscape in which anti-democratic, authoritarian
currents are on the rise and eventually gaining a majority. This would allow for
a well-informed diagnosis of structural vulnerabilities and help identify possible
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remedies. My best guess is that such analytical thought-experiments may hint at
the importance of one particular factor: Robust, effective political pluralism. Pluralist
structures protect political opposition and facilitate resistance to authoritarian
erosions that a democratic system may have to face. Therefore, proactively and
robustly protecting the political agency of diverse and dissenting political platforms
and preferences throughout the political system seems crucial. This requires
institutional and procedural guarantees, some of which have been sketched out
here. Most importantly, it entails empowering and protecting parliamentarism and
effective opposition. This could at least help to make democracy more resistant to
anti-democratic, illiberal developments.
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